By Zonisha Ahmed

The question of media freedom versus national security is bound to arise in the wake of the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, which can be seen as one of the most turbulent periods in the recent political history of Pakistan. The aftermath of the arrest observe violent protests erupt in major cities such as Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi. Public and military property was targeted, essential services were disrupted, and civilians and law enforcement officials were injured. In such extraordinary circumstances, what constitutes permissible reporting as opposed to conduct that may potentially escalate the situation requires a careful constitutional and legal assessment.

The situation surrounding the four journalists, therefore, has to be assessed within the context of the extraordinary political turmoil that has engulfed Pakistan, as opposed to being viewed in a vacuum. The Constitution of Pakistan guarantees freedom of speech under Article 19, but at the same time also provides that this right is to be reasonable restricted in the interests of national security, public order, and the integrity of the state. This is a reflection of a widely accepted constitutional tenet: rights are fundamental but not absolute. The issue is not whether the right to journalism is guaranteed, but whether the conduct was within the permissible limits of that right.

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 in Pakistan enables special courts to act when speech or conduct leads to terrorism, violence, and threats to public order. Court documents indicate that the reporting by journalists often focused on violent clashes without sufficient context. In an already volatile environment, such reporting was likely to contribute to further unrest. The court here made a distinction not between reporting and silence but between factual reporting and reporting that might plausibly increase volatility.

From a theoretical perspective, the question can be explored through the “clear and present danger” paradigm of comparative constitutional law. This paradigm enables the suppression of speech when there is a clear and present danger to public order. Similarly, securitization theory in international relations helps to understand how countries in times of extreme crises can take extraordinary but well-grounded steps to eliminate threats to stability. In both theories, the principle of proportionality is essential.

In this particular instance, the Anti-Terrorism Court acted as it is expected to by law. There were hearings, the evidence was considered, and the verdict was the result of judicial consideration. The fact that there were hearings and a careful consideration of the evidence presented means that the verdict was arrived at through official channels and not through arbitrary decision-making. Unless there is a clear procedural error, the verdict stands as a legal pronouncement that can be appealed within the constitutional framework.
International organizations such as “Reporters Without Borders” tend to view such issues through a wide and universal prism that sometimes does not take into consideration the complex security environment of a country like Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan has been embroiled in a struggle against terrorism, insurgency, and violence that has political overtones means that rules are applied in a crisis situation in a certain way. Media ethics, as defined by the Press Council of Pakistan, emphasize prudence, truth, and maintaining context in a situation where reporting can influence public conduct.

It is worth pointing out that the recognition of legal accountability does not undermine the importance of a free press. The principle of democracy has always held that freedom must function in a context of responsibility. The state has a constitutional obligation to safeguard life, property, and the continuity of institutions. As soon as speech spills over into violent escalation that jeopardizes these obligations, judicial oversight becomes not only legitimate but necessary.

Thus, the decision reaffirms a fundamental democratic tenet: freedom of expression coexists with constitutional limitations that aim to secure public order. It does not abrogate constitutional rights, nor does it criminalize journalism as a profession. Rather, it firmly establishes that all individuals, regardless of their position, are subject to laws fashioned through constitutional means.

In extremely polarized political environments, conflicts between liberty and security are bound to arise. A healthy constitutional democracy is not defined by the absence of conflict but by the constitutional legitimacy of its management. The situation involving the four journalists must be located in this context: a specific legal dispute that turns on the interpretation of statutes, the assessment of evidence, and the balance of constitutional values, rather than a general assault on freedom of expression.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the writer's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of The South Asia Times